Double-Auction Mechanism for Distribution of Electrical Supply Capacities among Enterprises of an Industrial Park


  • Jorge Ruben Vega Universidad Tecnológica Nacional (UTN), Facultad Regional Santa Fe (FRSF)
  • Ariel Rocchi
  • Erica Fernandez


energy, electric market, game theory


Typically, an industry contracts a given electrical supply capacity to the energy distribution company for a relatively long time period. Such kind of contract is often expensive for the industry, because large supply capacities must be considered in order to avoid penalty fees due to an eventually high peak power demand that could occur even along a short time period. This paper proposes a dynamic strategy for simultaneously assigning the price and the fraction of power supply capacity to every industry located in an industrial park. The assignment strategy aims at reaching a joint benefit for all the involved enterprises (i.e., the industries and the energy distribution company). The proposed procedure involves 3 sequential algorithms. The strategy for supply capacity re-assignment is based on a double-auction mechanism, which can be applied at time periods of arbitrary duration. The proposal is evaluated on the basis of a synthetic example that involves three industries and one energy distribution company.


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